Introduction
At present, there are no general provisions on the use of intelligence information in criminal procedure, but it is in fact commonly used as a sort of evidence worldwide, especially in relation with cases of terrorism. Nevertheless, a fundamental distinction between intelligence information and evidence must be drawn as their nature and the way they are gathered differ in many respects. 2 Hence, special care must be taken whenever intelligence reports are presented as evidence in criminal proceedings.
Not only is Spain no exception, but it may be one of the countries where such intelligence information has been employed most frequently in criminal procedure due to the conflagration of terrorism; the days of ETA terrorism in the past and nowadays by Islamic Jihadist extremists. 3 Of course, no regulation on the use of intelligence information is foreseen in Spanish criminal procedural legislation, despite considerable amendments to the law on criminal procedure, a legislative act that dates back to 1882. 4 As previously mentioned, intelligence reports are commonly accepted in judicial practice by different judges and courts. In fact, this extensive recourse to intelligence information arises from the global trend towards 'securitisation'. 5 In brief, this trend Law of the enemy' (Feindstrafrecht), to use the expression coined by Gunther Jakobs. 11 In this context, a new Criminal Law in the form of an Emergency Law is foreseen, in order to preserve the main aim of security, where necessary providing for the exclusion of the rule of law, i.e. substantive and/or procedural rights in Criminal Law. The most relevant concern is that measures of an exceptional nature will become a habitual rule in comparative and national legislations; their habitual nature being their most dangerous aspect. 12 This theory, the basis for variations in national Criminal Law, has prompted legislation in EU and Member States, that shares a common characteristic; the anticipation of risk and, logically, the anticipation of the criminality (Vorlagerungen). 13 Its final consequences in the criminal justice system can signal a dangerous shift in the direction of a police state.
14 In concrete, the Criminal Law of the enemy has inspired specific substantive and procedural rules that are enforced in national legislations, in an attempt to guarantee internal security; a flashpoint for this criminal legislation was 2001, following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA. 15 Security thereby acquired the urgency of ultra ratio 16 over and above the traditional principle in Criminal Law of ultima ratio.
17
It is obvious here that this approach has been adopted following the importance attached to internal security within EU borders.
18 But this 'War on Terror' and counter-terrorism actions were 21 The scales of the fragile balance between security and justice (or rights) 22 is certainly leaning in favor of the former; in fact, not long afterwards a further strategy on the promotion of procedural rights in criminal proceedings would be initiated only to end in failure. 23 In this context, intelligence information is gaining singular importance both in criminal procedure worldwide and in Spain. Law enforcement agents gather information within this preventive or proactive setting to produce intelligence reports; moreover, such practices are today described as 'building information positions', as part of a new approach to intelligence referred to as Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). 24 Nevertheless, the present paper focuses on the analysis of the declaring the inexistance of a concept of internal security in the limits of EU territory. By contrast, the European Council promotes the reinforcement of internal security through the implementation of the EU 25 Here the concept of information relates to information that law-enforcement authorities collect in criminal investigations in Member States, with the intention of employing it as ''evidence before a judicial authority'' as described earlier, even when the European rule imposes no such obligation and consent is required by the 'provider' Member State. 26 In relation with criminal procedure, the investigative phase is increasingly the essential element of criminal proceedings, where corroborating the crime and identifying the criminals justifies the collection of relevant criminal information by appropriate authorities and agencies. 27 So, the idea of intelligence drives a considerable part of European criminal policy. European institutions began the construction of an EU criminal intelligence model (ECIM) following the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005; it was promoted by the British Minister of Home Affairs during the EU British Presidency and modelled on the National Intelligence Model of the UK. 28 It is important to stress that a definition of intelligence at EU level, which has up until now been absent in European instruments, is now crucial.
29
In general terms, the United States provided a broad definition of criminal intelligence, along the lines now foreseen by European institutions, 30 in a document that the US Justice Administration drafted under the title of the 'National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan' (NCISP, 2003) . 31 Criminal intelligence is identified here as ''information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in a effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity'', while intelligence is equivalent to ''the product of systematic gathering, evaluation, and synthesis of raw data on individuals or activities suspected of being, or known to be, criminal in nature''.
32
At the level of the EU, a specific definition of intelligence is included in the aforementioned Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006, where intelligence is envisaged as two different types of information: ''(i) any type of information on data which is held by law enforcement authorities; (ii) any type of information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities and which is available to law enforcement authorities without the taking of coercive measures . . . ''. 33 In general terms and without specific reference to intelligence, it must also be remembered that Article 87 (2) TFEU, enacted following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon as part of the policy on police cooperation, foresees the adoption of measures by the European Parliament and the Council. These measures concern ''the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of general information'', taking into account that the principle that is enforced therein is the principle of operational cooperation according to Article 87 (2) TFEU, although mutual trust is also involved. account that only the preliminary phase is foreseen; that means, according to the Preamble of the same FWD, that intelligence information fulfills a preventive, but not a repressive function in criminal policy. Hence, with greater clarity, Art. 1 (4) of the present Framework Decision ''does not impose any obligation on the part of Member States to provide information and intelligence to be used as evidence before a judicial authority nor does it give any right to use such information or intelligence for that purpose''; but such a provision is hardly very exacting in this context, as it contains no prohibition on the Member State providing and/or agreeing to the employment of intelligence information as evidence 35 as happens in judicial practice. Nevertheless, the question once again is whether intelligence information, even when justified by the fight against terrorism 36 and organised crime throughout the EU, should be incorporated in criminal procedure. Ever since the terrorist attacks of 2001 in New York the traditional borderline between prevention and repression has become increasingly blurred; intelligence and law enforcement agencies now cooperate together with similar methods 37 in pursuit of the criminal throughout the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings, where the preconstitution of evidence takes place. But there is a fundamental difference between both actors in a further stage of criminal procedure, i.e. the trial itself, where adversarial confrontation becomes essential:
38 in the first case, information and/or reports that may be used as 'evidence', gathered by the police force, can be challenged by the defence counsel in the courtroom under constitutional and legal rules. In contrast, intelligence agencies normally depend on sources that cannot be revealed in the courtroom and, consequently, challenged by the defence; but, examples of intelligence information presented as evidence in judicial practice are multiplying. 39 It is here that the 'judicialisation of intelligence' is a pressing need. 40 One particular debate on the European agenda concerns the possibility of certain member state legislations accepting secret evidence in criminal procedure, with judicial authorisation, without the defendant being granted access to the information, if so requested by the government. The best example is the recent regulation in the UK with the adoption in 2013 of a new provision with the title of 'closed material procedure' (CMP), as part of the Justice and Security Act. 41 The Another case is also pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 43 and previous case-law by same European Court has been pronounced mutatis mutandis.
44 Fortunately, it is not the case in Spain at the moment; hopefully, no similar provision will be enforced in relation to expert evidence in any further regulations.
Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union has also accepted the extreme idea of employing 'secret evidence' in the courtroom linked to intelligence information in the name of 'national security', but at all times with due respect for human rights standards. Among the best examples is the case of Digital Rights Ireland, in which a preliminary ruling from the ECtHR was delivered on 8 April 2014 in response to the petition from the Irish High Court under Art. 267 TFEU that had been joined with a request for a ruling from the Constitutional Court of Austria. , not yet completed. The ECJ concluded that the national court with jurisdiction is required ''to ensure that failure by the competent national authority to disclose to the person concerned, precisely and in full, the grounds on which a decision taken . . . and to disclose the related evidence to him is limited to that which is strictly necessary, and that he is informed, in any event of the essence of those grounds in a manner which takes due account of the necessary confidentiality of the evidence'' (paras. 57-68). Judgment resolving the preliminary ruling promoted by the Court of Appeal (England and Wales, Civil Division) in relation with the decision refusing admission in UK of a EU citizen on public security grounds; a prior appeal took place before the interference'' in the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter; the right of respect for private and family life and the right to privacy with regard to the processing of personal data. Although the decision ran into criticism, because of the sparsity of its arguments, 46 the present case has clearly added to the urgency to enforce the new package of proposals launched by the European Commission on data protection that have recently been approved. 47 It should also be remembered than further ECJ case law has been pronounced placing limits on mass surveillance when personal data are involved.
48
In the following section, the present situation in Spain in this field is discussed along with future proposals that may be applicable.
National framework and legal regulation: the Spanish perspective
The question of whether a national strategy and/or definition of intelligence exists will be considered, as will the body that published it at a national level, in the context of current Spanish legislation. It will also be very important to determine the use of such intelligence reports in criminal procedure. In fact, despite the strategy on intelligence at EU level and the abovementioned legal instruments, the Member States of the EU remain the main actors on intelligence as far as they are the ''collectors, producers and users of intelligence''. 
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events include the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004, in Madrid, as a sequel to those that occurred on 11 September 2001; 51 however, the government of the day initially attributed the attacks to Basque nationalists (ETA), openly contradicting reports transmitted on the media over following days that clearly pointed to Al-Qaeda. 52 In any case and for all brands of terrorism and organised crime, it is of fundamental importance to identify the structure of the terrorist and/or criminal organisation, not only when a criminal act has been committed, but beforehand when an organisation may be conspiring to commit new terrorist/criminal acts. 53 It is here that intelligence information can play its leading role as the main source of information in the preventive investigation of criminal intent.
Academies of Political and Social Sciences in Spain habitually draw a clear distinction between 'information' and 'intelligence', in order to define the concept of intelligence information from the national perspective, considering that ''information is any unprocessed data, while intelligence is the same information after further evaluation in the intelligence cycle; after being evaluated, processed and integrated with other (intelligence) [information]''; 54 in this context, intelligence is referred to as 'intelligence work' or 'intelligence services'. 55 Scholars have also distinguished between the different functions or even categories of intelligence such as military, security, criminal, and external or foreign intelligence; it is clear that criminal intelligence is given special priority as long as it ''engages in the fight against serious and organised crime''. This intelligence differs from the others because ''it is linked to criminal investigations, which aim to produce evidence that can result in a conviction in a court of law'', according to a global definition provided by Björn Müller-Wille. 56 But in fact, any other sort of intelligence that complies with the same requirements should receive a similar assessment in criminal procedure.
In Spain, the law on intelligence provides a concrete definition together with legal regulation of the matter: Law 11/2002, May 6, on regulation of the National Intelligence Centre 57 (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) or CNI. This special public institution was set up for the intelligence services to provide ''efficient, specialised and modern Intelligence Services, capable of meeting the new challenges of today's national and international scenario, and governed by the principles of control and full subjection to the legal order'' according to the first paragraph of its Exposition of Motives. Moreover, Chap. 1, Sect. 1 describes the general function of the new institution, which is ''for providing the Prime Minister and the Government with information analyses, studies or proposals, that allow for the prevention and avoidance of any danger, threat or aggression against the independence or territorial integrity of Spain, its national interests and the stability of its institutions and the rule of law''.
Law 31/2010 of July 27 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, in transposition of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006, is also very relevant to intelligence in Spain. 58 Here the concepts of intelligence and information are equated and, according to Article 1, both services can be delivered by competent security services (law enforcement authorities), 59 for the a) ''gathering, processing and analysing information on crimes and criminal activities prior to criminal prosecution by the forces of law and order, in order to establish whether specific criminal acts have been committed or may be committed in the future'' under the title of criminal intelligence operations; b) ''to undertake appropriate measures in order to investigate the facts, suspects and circumstances in relation to one or more specific criminal acts, which have been committed'' under the title of criminal investigations. In this context, information and/or intelligence is composed of a) ''all types of information or data held by the law enforcement authorities'' and b) ''all types of information or data held by public authorities or private institutions, which may 
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be accessed by law enforcement authorities without having to employ coercive measures defined in accordance with Spanish legislation'' (Article 2).
Having defined the concept of intelligence information, its validity in Spanish criminal procedure should be analysed. None of this legislation refers to the effect or validity of those intelligence reports and/or information. In all logic, this regulation should form part of ordinary procedural legislation in the context of criminal procedure.
Nevertheless, no provision for any general rule may be found in Spanish procedural legislation that contains guidance on how this intelligence information can be used at the judicial stage. In concrete, the Spanish Criminal Procedure Act (1882) 60 includes no rule that refers to intelligence information, in contrast to some other national legislations that at least determine the use in judicial process of statements or reports from public authorities.
61 From a legal perspective, there should be no place for the use of intelligence information in the context of criminal procedure in Spain, although the real situation is very different: intelligence information and/or intelligence reports exist and are increasingly used, especially in cases related to terrorism 62 and organised crime. For this reason, a review of some current judicial practice will undoubtedly prove useful.
Functioning of intelligence information in Spanish criminal procedure according to judicial practice
As is examined further on, intelligence reports are increasingly cited in Spanish judicial practice, despite the absence of any specific regulation on their use in criminal procedure rules. The question here is to analyze the sort of evidence that is employed among the different tools compiled in criminal procedure legislation and how far such judicial practice observes the procedural rights of the suspect. In fact, as will be argued, judicial practice that accepts such intelligence reports as evidence is harmful to defence rights. In general, the judicial practice of Spanish courts evaluates intelligence information under the same rules as expert evidence but with special features. Hence, in academia, of the few Spanish scholars to have researched the topic of criminal procedure, 63 most 60. See supra note 4. 61. Thus, in Germany, for example, Section 256(1)(a) StPO states that official documents may be presented as evidence and read out aloud during the trial applying to those 'statements containing a certificate or an opinion from public authorities'; nevertheless, no qualification of a specific sort of evidence is included here; according to the text, such statements could be considered as expertise or documentary evidence; English version of the Strafprozeßordnung is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/index.html (last visited: 3 January 2017). Also, Rule 803 (8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the USA lists exceptions to the prohibition of hearsay for 'public records', ifinter allia-they set out ''a) the office's activities; b) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report''; but in this case, it expressly excludes ''in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel''; Federal Rules of Evidence are available, e.g. at http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre (last visited: 3 January 2017). See also, on this topic, the contributions of practitioners, e.g. E. De Llera Suárez-Bárcena, 'La utilización de la información policial y de los servicios de inteligencia como prueba en el proceso penal', Diario La Ley, 19 December argue that, due to the absence of specific categorisation and its singularity, as regulated in the present Criminal Procedure Act (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, henceforth LECrim), intelligence information should be categorised as another sort of evidence; in concrete, in the form of a specific kind of expertise other than that described under Art. 456 LECrim. 64 It could therefore be referred to as 'police intelligence' and/or even 'intelligence expert evidence'.
Nevertheless, there is still some discussion among scholars and practitioners over the case-law on the categorisation of intelligence reports prepared by law enforcement authorities as expert evidence, especially when those reports are from the police force. That debate has focused on whether intelligence information may be equated with testimonial evidence, rather than expert evidence as some scholars and especially judicial practitioners have argued. It is true that, in both cases, evaluation of the evidence shall be done under the system of free evaluation of evidence outlined in Article 741 LECrim; 65 but, in practice, the burden of proof attributed to expert reports is often considered more relevant than testimony. 66 The matter is usually resolved by assessing the contribution to the proceedings of scientific, artistic and, more properly, expert knowledge. In this context, it will be much more difficult for the defence counsel to challenge expert evidence in court, as only testimonial evidence may be considered.
It should also be taken into account that, in general terms, Spanish criminal procedure currently accepts that the reports presented by the police force under the title of a 'police statement' (atestado) 67 , following the preliminary criminal investigation of the facts, can in no way constitute documentary evidence. According to Art. 297 LECrim, the police report only serves as a 'crime report' 68 and must be ratified at the trial by its authors, whose declarations shall be evaluated as testimonial evidence. This argument has been extensively corroborated by important constitutional doctrine on numerous occasions since 1980 up until the present. 69 In this context, according to the aforementioned constitutional case-law, pretrial investigative acts can never on the whole constitute evidence, as they must be reproduced 2013, num. 8215, http://diariolaley.laley.es as well as J.J. Hernández Domínguez, 'Valor procesal del informe de inteligencia policial', Diario La Ley, 21 October 2013, num. 8174, http://diariolaley.laley.es. 64. Textually, ''the Judge shall agree to an expert report when, to understand or appreciate some significant fact or circumstance in the pre-trial proceedings scientific or artistic knowledge is necessary or appropriate''. On the concept of pre-trial proceedings or sumario, see specifically M. Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 38, at p. 433. 65. Textually, ''the court, appraising the evidence given during the trial in good conscience, the reasons put forward for the prosecution and the defence, and the statements by the accused themselves, will pass sentence within the time limit set in this Law''. 
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at the trial in accordance with the rules for the presentation of evidence in the Criminal Procedure Act.
70
Another important problem arises in the trial phase when the counsel for the defence challenges either expert or testimonial evidence relating to intelligence information, where general rules on oral criminal proceedings and their notification shall be applied in accordance with Art. 649 LECrim and, especially, Art. 120 Spanish Constitution. 71 If intelligence information is used in evidence, it must be presented with respect for procedural rights and open to adversarial challenge in a public trial; 72 it implies disclosure and cross-examination rights by the defence permitting questioning in the trial phase. Both aspects are also found in European criminal procedures that follow the inquisitorial format, as guaranteed in European and international conventions. 73 Both experts and witnesses may participate in questioning in accordance with Arts. 724 and 707 et seq LECrim with the compulsory presence of the accused and counsel.
In this context, the categorisation of intelligence as evidence in court has also been criticised in judicial practice, in so far as the principle of contradiction and rules on confrontation during proceedings have not always been observed with particular intelligence reports presented by the police force, when presented as 'secret evidence'. 74 Such unwillingness to disclose intelligence sources to the accused is justified in terms of the protection national security, which is argued to be of overriding importance in relation to fundamental rights. 75 Defence lawyers, especially, have challenged such arguments, when a clear violation of the right to be presumed innocence, 76 that is specifically contemplated as a fundamental right under Art. 24 (2) Spanish Constitution, is apparent from their point of view, in addition to other defence rights to be observed under due process of law.
According to the judicial practice of Spanish courts, intelligence reports are admissible evidence. 77 At the start of the new Millennium, the Spanish Supreme Court began to attach special importance to police reports that referred to intelligence work, considering that they contributed specific technical knowledge (expertise) to criminal procedure. Its decision implied the use of intelligence information, qualified as expert evidence, in terrorism-related cases. The first judgment in this context was Supreme Court Sentence (hereinafter STS) 2084/2001, on December 13, 78 concerning an explosion at the barracks of the Civil Guard in Llodio (Á lava, Basque Country). In resolution of the appeal brought by the defence, the Supreme Court upheld the earlier reasoning of the Criminal Division of the National Court; declaring that reports prepared by members of the Civil Guard (public sector employees) can be considered 'intelligence reports', categorising their special expertise as 'expert intelligence evidence': this is the initial and/or first position on the evaluation of intelligence reports advanced by the Spanish Supreme Court as a type of expert evidence.
In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the conclusions of the National Court and for the first time presented an important doctrine on the concept and procedural value of intelligence reports in criminal proceedings. This doctrine advances a new jurisprudential criterion that evaluates police reports prepared by law enforcement authorities as expert intelligence evidence rather than testimonial evidence. 79 On this point, the Supreme Court highlighted the difference between the concepts of expert and witness; 80 it also justified the need to request expert opinion as a 'means of assistance' when the judge alone is unable to verify the truth of the facts. Lastly, it argued that appropriate requirements have been observed, such as the physical presentation of the reports by experts in tandem with the possibility of the defence contesting the reports (mentioned as a possibility and not employed in the specific case in point).
In contrast, later on in STS 1029/2005, on September 26, the Supreme Court changed its criterion declaring that in this case ''the proposed expert report was nothing more than a police analysis of the statements produced by the defendants'' and provided ''neither qualitatively 77 . Only Supreme Court case law will be examined here, although there is obviously jurisprudence on the topic pronounced by the National Court and the Provincial Courts, among others. 78. Available through the Supreme Court search form at http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/index.jsp (last visited: 20 January 2017). Another relevant judgment on the topic is STS 786/2003, of May 29, again in relation to ETA terrorism; here the Supreme Court stated the validity of 'police intelligence evidence', as it is increasingly employed in criminal procedure, so that the judge may acquire appropriate technical knowledge according to Article 456 LECrim; in the same case, the expert intelligence evidence is considered as no more than ''a variant of the expert evidence referred to in Art. 456 LECrim''. 79. Textually, ''it is a matter of relating various pieces of information, beginning with the knowledge held by certain experts of the Civil Guard, to draw conclusions'', in other words, ''from all of the information available to them (not only in this case, but taken from a great many police procedures and documentation), they managed to draw certain conclusions, which were then, in turn, applied to concrete actions. It is, therefore, a question of an expert report that consists of relating information, so as to draw certain conclusions; in no case would we be faced with testimonial evidence, but expert evidence, which on the basis of in-depth knowledge of the way certain ETA commandos operate, of their organization, . . . leads to specific conclusions'' (Para. 11. VII). 80. ''The expert, as opposed to the witness, holds objective technical, scientific, artistic and practical knowledge, prior to and unrelated to the proceedings, being for that reason substitutable, and what justifies his intervention is precisely the logic of his science, occupying an active position in relation to the examination of what constitutes the object of the expert opinion. The witness testifies to past events related to the proceedings sensorially perceived by him, being for that reason irreplaceable in the proceedings and adopting a passive stance in so far as he is the object of the cross examination'' (Para. 11.VIII).
186
New Journal of European Criminal Law 8(2) different nor properly specialised knowledge'' that the judge might have missed. In short, the reasoning of the Supreme Court, along the same lines as the National Court, considered that the declarations of the Basque police (Ertzaintza) during the trial had to be considered testimonial evidence and not expert evidence. 81 Besides, in this case, their declarations failed to present sufficient evidence a quo, in the opinion of the judge (National Court), to alter the presumption of innocence; a ruling that the Supreme Court later upheld on appeal. Also, if the last case is compared with earlier ones, the different burden of proof between expert and testimonial evidence in securing a conviction may be appreciated. 82 It was the second position adopted in Spanish Supreme Court case-law relating to intelligence information evidence.
Since that ruling, the Supreme Court has evaluated police reports as either expert evidence or testimony, on the basis of their contribution to the criminal cause; in the first case, the reference is to 'intelligence information'. In this context, the following SSTS 556/2006, on May 31 and 119/ 2007, on February 16, also evaluated police reports as testimonial evidence, reproducing arguments included in an earlier judgement STS 1029/2005; as in the previous sentences, it was considered that the police reports, which studied the links of the accused to terrorist groups, could not be qualified as technical knowledge. But in other case-law such as STS 655/2007, of June 25 and especially STS 783/2007, of October 1, the evaluation of 'police intelligence' as expert or testimonial evidence was unclear; the Supreme Court failed to consider that the difference was relevant, provided that Art. 741 LECrim was in both cases applied, so that the evidence as explained earlier could be freely evaluated by the sentencing court. In concrete, the police intelligence report was placed in a special category under the title of 'police intelligence evidence'; this case may be seen as the third position advanced by the Spanish Supreme Court, although it is much closer (and even overlaps) the first rather than the second position.
Subsequent case-law pronounced by the Supreme Court since 2009 83 has generally looked favourably on the definition of intelligence information as expert evidence (first position) as defined in Art. 456 LECrim. In some cases, it is considered a special sort of expertise in the absence of any specific legal regulation that is evaluated according to the characteristics of this specific form of expert evidence previously described in STS 783/2007, although with a specific definition. 84 Other judgments still express doubt over the nature of this intelligence information, considering that it is of a mixed nature somewhere between expertise and testimony (third position), although the greater proximity to the former appears obvious. The question concerning the impartiality of the police force and/or law enforcement agents that draft these intelligence reports 81 . In fact, there is no reference to intelligence information in the entire text. 82. In relation to the lack of credibility of testimonial declarations see J. Leal Medina, 'El juicio de credibilidad en las declaraciones testificales. Elementos subjetivos y objetivos. Incidencia de la presunción de inocencia en los diferentes tipos de testimonios y problemas más frecuentes que plantea', Diario La Ley, reports are ''a means of evidence not provided for by law, the authors of these reports being experts in this kind of information who assist the Tribunal, by providing interpretive elements on objective data that are included in the case, the important point being whether the conclusions they draw are rational and may by assumed by the Tribunal, rationally expounded and contested during the proceedings'' (Para. 10.2.IV). This definition has been used in subsequent case-law.
is also favourably resolved. 85 On occasions, disagreement between various magistrates on the bench over the evaluation of intelligence evidence has resulted in dissenting opinions, contrary to the majority judgment. 86 In summary, although the Supreme Court still evaluates these questions on a case-by-case basis and regardless of whether the so-called police intelligence reports do in fact constitute expert intelligence evidence within the definition of intelligence provided in prior case-law, 87 it is clear that this new method of expert evidence is gaining greater acceptance in the courtroom. In this context, it appears as though the third position maintained by Supreme Court case-law in its abovementioned judgment STS 783/2007 has predominated in subsequent case-law 88 favourable to different forms of categorisation of such evidence, despite the absence of regulation of this new form of expertise. In fact, there is at present little discussion on the topic in judicial practice, suggesting that reliance on this new form of evidence, supported in the case law of the Supreme Court, is set to continue for some time to come.
But an explicit provision in the Criminal Procedure Act would also be desirable, which up until today has yet to appear, despite several amendments over recent years. 89 Such specific provision appears more essential when a new form of evidence (even when close to expertise) is appreciated and defended by judicial practice and scholarship, taking into account the fundamental rights that are at stake. Until that time, with the law as it stands and the refinements of case-law, in the absence of compliance with the principles of contradiction and defence, such intelligence reports should have no more probative value than a 'complementary or coadjuvate' one to evidence that is deemed admissible. 90 Finally, some recommendations on 'best practice' in the context of intelligence information may be added, as examples to consider in future legal regulation on this topic in Spain. These recommendations cover the most complex questions to have arisen in the discussion in Spanish academia in relation to intelligence evidence and its use in criminal proceedings. 91 The special categorisation of Obviously, as has been stated, the major risk here is a probable collision between intelligence information and/or reports and fundamental rights. In terms of criminal procedure, the observance of such fundamental rights especially presupposes the protection of the principle of contradiction (or confrontation) 97 , jointly with the enforcement of procedural guarantees, and other defence rights. It is therefore relevant to determine how this intelligence information may be presented in court, in keeping with the essential principles of due process as well as any discussion over the impartiality of the contents of intelligence reports and their authors as exposed. 98 Otherwise, the right to a fair trial as described in international and European regulations 99 as well as in specific parts of the Spanish constitution 100 will be threatened. Fortunately the EU has paid greater attention to procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings over the past few years. Evidence of this interest is the enactement of the Roadmap for strengthening the procedural rights of suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings 101 in 2009 providing minimum rules in this area. It includes several measures related to procedural safeguards in criminal procedure existing at the time binding regulation to be implemented by Member States. 102 The idea is to foster the right to a fair trial in criminal procedure throughout EU territory.
